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Despite widespread policy interest in market solutions to public service delivery,
a large literature on the eect of private schooling on academic achievement
shows little or no causal benet. In a much-cited paper, Hsieh and Urquiola
(2006) nd that a voucher program that dramatically expanded private school-
ing in Chile led to no discernible increase in test scores over time. For the U.S.,
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) nd little or no impact of Catholic schooling on
test scores after controlling for selection eects. Similarly for Indonesia, New-
house and Beegle (2011) nd that private schooling has a signicant, negative
eect on test scores. Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer (2002) nd
signicantly positive, but modest eects from a policy experiment in Colombia,
with recipients of randomly-allocated vouchers scoring roughly 0.2 standard de-
viations higher than non-recipients.
In this paper we demonstrate that in a low-income African country with weak
public-sector institutions, i.e. Kenya, the eect on test scores of moving to
private schooling may be dramatically higher than found in previous work in the
U.S., Latin America or Asia.1
Over the past decade, private school enrollment has grown rapidly in Kenya.
In a companion paper, we argue that this secular trend was driven, somewhat
paradoxically, by the abolition of fees in public primary schools in 2003, and the
concomitant decline in the perceived quality of public schools (Bold, Kimenyi,
Mwabu, and Sandefur 2011).
The main contribution of the paper lies in estimating the causal eect of pri-
vate schooling on test performance for Kenyan primary school students using
nationwide standardized test scores. An obvious obstacle here is the endoge-
nous sorting of pupils. The key to our identication strategy is aggregation
in the spirit of Hsieh and Urquiola (2006). The growth of private enrollment
will only aect average scores in a district { aggregating over both public and
private schools { inasmuch as there is a genuine causal force at work. Control-
ling for time-invariant district characteristics, we document a large performance
advantage of Kenyan private schools, equivalent to a full standard deviation of
pupil-level test scores.
Furthermore, we use survey data on households' education expenditure to show
1Notably, Cox and Jimenez (1991) show that private secondary schools perform poorly
relative to government schools in Tanzania. This highlights a common feature of both the
Kenyan and Tanzanian school system: while government primary schools lag behind private
schools in test performance, selective government secondary schools remain competitive.
1Table 1: Achievement: Summary Statistics for KCPE Exams
Average Score Pupils Sitting Exam
Priv Priv
All Gov't Priv Premium All Gov't Priv Share
1998 247 245 281 14.7% 441,742 420,406 21,336 4.8%
1999 247 245 286 16.7% 450,030 426,486 23,544 5.2%
2000 247 245 288 17.6% 475,951 449,255 26,696 5.6%
2001 247 244 291 19.3% 509,325 476,988 32,337 6.3%
2002 247 244 291 19.3% 534,865 495,757 39,108 7.3%
2003 247 243 297 22.2% 583,439 539,175 44,264 7.6%
2004 247 243 297 22.2% 652,224 598,649 53,575 8.2%
2005 247 243 290 19.3% 665,644 600,767 64,877 9.7%
Averages scores are based on school-level data, weighted by the number of pupils sitting the
exam in each school. Scores are re-based each year so that the national average is constant.
This re-basing preserves changes in relative performance between sub-groups of test takers.
that Kenyan private schools operate at low cost relative to public schools: nearly
two-thirds of pupils in the private system pay fees less than the median per-pupil
funding level in government schools.
2 The raw achievement gap
Our performance measure is provided by scores on the Kenya Certicate of
Primary Education (KCPE) examination, administered to all pupils completing
primary school nationwide, in public and private schools.
Table (1) shows the trajectory of KCPE scores over time for public and private
schools separately. The raw achievement gap between these sectors is both
large { ranging from 14.7% to 22.2% { and increasing over most of the period.
The upward trend in private school enrollment is also visible in the share of
test-takers from private schools, increasing from 4.8% in 1998 to 9.7% in 2005.
3 Identication strategy
We use the KCPE exam data to estimate the eect of private schooling on
achievement, and further, to test whether this causal performance gap changed
over time.
2The key to our identication strategy is aggregation. Clearly, private schools
may outperform public schools either because of the causal in
uence of private
schooling on scores, or the selection of more able students into private schooling,
or some combination of both. However, the transfer of pupils from public to
private schools will only aect average scores { aggregating over both public
and private schools { inasmuch as there is a genuine causal force at work.
Following on this logic, we take as our dependent variable the average score
across both public and private schools for all students of a given gender, in a
given district, and a given year. These cells are chosen to be as small as possible
to allow sucient degrees of freedom for estimation, but large enough so that
students cannot endogenously select out of their cell. We regress these average
scores on the proportion of pupils in private schools within the gender-district-
year cell, controlling for cell-specic xed eects. Furthermore, we control for
common time trends using year dummies.
The consistency of our xed-eects estimates hinges on the strict exogeneity of
private enrolment shares conditional on an unobserved district-gender-cell eect.
Translating this strict exogeneity assumption to our application, we require that
(i) students choose between government and private schools within their own
district, and (ii) year-to-year changes in the proportion of pupils in private
schools within a given district are driven primarily by supply-side factors. The
second assumption is justied in the Kenyan context given the large supply-side
shock of the FPE reform. Additionally, the exogenous 
ow of new graduates
from teacher-training colleges (combined with a hiring freeze in government
schools since 2001) is a key factor behind the growth of the private system.
To be explicit about the limitations of our approach, note that the results
would be compromised by district-level, idiosyncratic shocks to the demand for
private schooling that also directly in
uence exam performance. An example of
such a shock would be a district-specic (positive) income shock that increases
households' ability to pay for private schooling, and also increases human capital
accumulation through, say, improved nutrition.
To see more clearly how data aggregation overcomes selection bias, we write
exam performance, Y , of individual i in school-sector j of district-gender cell
d at time t as a function of district and time eects, the impact of private
education, and an idiosyncratic error term.
Yijdt = 0 + d + t + (p0 + p;ijdt)Privateijdt + ijdt (1)
The p;ijdt re
ects the possibility of idiosyncratic returns to private schooling.
Naively estimating Equation (1) by OLS using pupil- or school-level data will
3produce the following coecient on the private school dummy:
~ p = p0 +  +  (2)
where
  E[ijdtjj = p]   E[ijdtjj = g] 6= 0 and
  E[p;ijdtjj = p] 6= 0
Equation (2) highlights two sources of selection bias: selection of more (or less)
able individuals into private schools, , and selection of individuals with a
higher (or lower) idiosyncratic return to private education into private schools,
.
Aggregating the data into district-gender cells can overcome the rst source of
bias. Estimation of Equation (1) by OLS using cell-level data yields
^ p = p0 +  (3)
where the  term drops out due to averaging. In the terminology of the eval-
uation literature, ^ p is a local average treatment eect, measuring the average
return to private schooling for those who choose to enrol in private schools.
We are also interested in whether the private-school premium changed over time,
especially in the wake of FPE. We investigate this through a simple interaction
term. Thus our nal estimating equation is,
Y dt = 0 + d + t + p0Privatedt + p1Privatedt  FPEt + dt; (4)
using a panel of average KCPE scores. Equation (4) is an aggregate achieve-
ment production function that nets out all individual level and compositional
sorting eects on achievement. The coecient on Private therefore measures {
under plausible identication assumptions { all value added of private schools
(including spillovers in achievement from peers).
4 Results
Table (2) shows the results from estimating variants of Equation (4), with
various combinations of district and year xed eects.
As a benchmark, columns 1 and 2 regress school-level test scores on a private-
school dummy using disaggregated school data. The estimated `eect' of private
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5schooling is thus potentially biased by endogenous selection of more able pupils
into private schools. Nevertheless, the gap between public and private schools
is large (51.4 exam points) and as seen in column 2, widens signicantly over
time.2
Columns 3 to 7 use aggregated data from the district-gender cells, removing the
eects of endogenous sorting from the estimated private-schooling coecients.
The 262,562 primary schools in the sample are collapsed into 1,182 cells, repre-
senting the 75 districts over 8 years, separated by gender. In all specications,
the private schooling eect remains large and signicant. With the inclusion
of both location and time eects, we nd a gap between private and public
schools of 64 exam points, or roughly one standard deviation of the underlying
pupil-level test scores.3
Including an interaction term between the private-school and FPE dummies in
columns 4-7 shows that the private-school eect did not increase under FPE.
Thus the increased public-private gap in the raw data over this period shown in
Table 1 is likely attributable to increased sorting of more able or better prepared
pupils into private schools after FPE.
Columns 5 to 7 perform additional robustness checks. A rst concern is that
results may be biased by idiosyncratic increases in the overall demand for educa-
tion in a district over time. To address this, we include an additional control for
total enrolment spanning both public and private schools in each district cell,
which acts as a time-varying proxy for the demand for education in the district.
While the coecient on this term is signicant, it does not undermine the core
result for private schooling. A second concern is that results may be driven
by outliers. Column 6 drops districts containing the largest 1% of year-on-year
changes in KCPE scores or private enrolment shares { leading to a loss of seven
districts. Again, the results are qualitatively unchanged, with the private-school
coecient only increasing in magnitude. A nal concern is that improvements
2Using school-level averages, the mean score in the regression sample is 247.1, with a
standard deviation of 42.5 points. However, for consistency with the literature, we report
eect sizes relative to the standard deviation of the underlying pupil-level data. While we do
not have access to pupil-level data for the sample used here, 2010 pupil-level data available at
yields an estimated standard deviation of 65.0 points, which we take as our denominator for
eect sizes throughout the paper.
3This very large implied eect refers to a binary switch from government to private school-
ing, which is relevant for an individual pupil but not for a district. The national increase in
the proportion of private-school test-takers from 1998 to 2005 was roughly 4.9%. Thus our
econometric estimates imply that this fairly dramatic expansion of private schooling led to a 5
point increase in average scores (point estimate of 64  4.9% increase in private schooling),
or 0.08 standard deviations of school-level average scores.
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Figure 1: The distribution of funding and test scores in public and private
schools
in data collection and data capture over time may have led to the inclusion of
more private schools in later years, creating the illusion of private enrolment
growth and performance gains. To address this concern column 7 restricts the
sample to a balanced panel of schools. The estimate of the private schooling
eect remains at 64.2 points.
5 Funding
The analysis in the previous section showed that private schooling raises test
scores. It does not necessarily follow that private schooling is more ecient
at delivering education, as measured by cost-benet ratio. The superior per-
formance of private schools may re
ect an advantage in terms of nancial and
human resources. Direct comparison of resource levels between public and pri-
vate schools is dicult because funding for each sector 
ows from dierent (and
sometimes multiple) sources, requiring collation of multiple data sources.
Private schools are funded by fees. Using data from the Kenya Integrated
Household Budget Survey (KIHBS), we calculate that private school fees per
primary school pupil had a median of $40.87 and a mean of $110.00 per year
in 2006.
In contrast, as of 2003 public primary schools in Kenya are forbidden from
charging fees. Instead, public schools receive two resource 
ows from the cen-
tral government. The rst is a per pupil grant, equivalent to approximately $14
per annum, transferred to a school bank account. The second resource, teaching
7sta, is provided in-kind. We place a value on teachers equivalent to their aver-
age salary divided by the pupil-teacher ratio in a given school. While salaries vary
by seniority and qualication, a nationwide survey conducted by the Kenya Na-
tional Examination Council (Kenya National Examination Council 2010) found
an average salary among civil service teachers of $262 per month over twelve
months in 2009 (the nearest available year), which we use as the basis for our
calculations. Variation in per pupil funding in the public school system arises
primarily due to dierences in stang levels, as re
ected in pupil-teacher ra-
tios. Based on administrative data from the Education Management Information
System (EMIS) maintained by the Ministry of Education, in 2005 the median
pupil-teacher ratio was 39.7 and the mean was 42.1 in public primary schools.
Combining these gures yields a median funding level of $83.81 and a mean of
$88.42 in public schools per pupil per annum.
Figure 1 plots the full distribution of funding and performance in public and
private primary schools. In the left-hand panel, the distribution of fees paid
for private schooling is juxtaposed with the distribution of per-pupil funding in
government schools (combining salary, pupil-teacher ratio, and capitation grant
data). Notably, these distributions cross at about the 67th percentile, or just
under $100 per year. Thus, comparing similar points in the distribution, the vast
majority of private schools operate more cheaply than their public counterparts.
The right-hand panel of Figure 1 presents the distribution of KCPE scores for
both public and private scores. Note that these distributions do not cross.
Rather, the private school distribution is markedly and uniformly to the right of
the public school score distribution.
6 Conclusion
We nd a robust, causal exam performance premium of one standard devi-
ation delivered by private schools. This point estimate is signicantly larger
than found in previous studies, and dwarfs the impact of narrower interventions
within public primary schools in the micro-empirical development literature (see
(Kremer 2003)). Furthermore, from a social perspective private schooling is
relatively cheap: nearly two-thirds (64%) of children in private schools pay fees
less than the median per-child funding levels in public schools circa 2005/6.
Taken together, our results suggest that expanding access to private schools
may provide a viable route to improving education quality at relatively low cost
in low-income countries with weak public school systems.
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9A Data Appendix
A.1 Test scores
The Kenya Certicate of Primary Education (KCPE) examination constitutes
the sole, nationwide, standardized test for primary students in Kenya. Our data
set constitutes an unbalanced panel of all public and private primary schools in
Kenya, for each year from 1998 to 2006. It contains information on average
scores achieved by girls and boys in the school, the number of test-takers of
each gender, the district of the school and whether it is government or private.
The test covers English, Kiswahili, math, science and history.
A.2 Household survey data
Data on fees in the private school sector is taken from the 2006 Kenya Integrated
Household Budget Survey (KIHBS), a nationally-representative, household sur-
vey conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, spanning 13,212
households.
A.3 School administrative data
For all Kenyan public schools, the Ministry of Education's Educational Monitor-
ing Information System (EMIS) database provides information on stang levels
and enrollment. Digitized data are available for the years 2002 to 2008.
10